March 24, 2008
By JIM YARDLEY
BEIJING — In the chaotic hours after Lhasa erupted March 14, Tibetans rampaged through the city’s old quarter, waving steel scabbards and burning or looting Chinese shops. Clothes, souvenirs and other tourist trinkets were dumped outside and set afire as thick gray smoke darkened the midday sky. Tibetan fury, uncorked, boiled over.
Foreigners and Lhasa residents who witnessed the violence were stunned by what they saw, and by what they did not see: the police. Riot police officers fled after an initial skirmish and then were often nowhere to be found. Some Chinese shopkeepers begged for protection.
“The whole day I didn’t see a single police officer or soldier,” said an American woman who spent hours navigating the riot scene. “The Tibetans were just running free.”
Lhasa is now occupied by thousands of paramilitary police officers and troops of the People’s Liberation Army. But witnesses say that for almost 24 hours, the paramilitary police seemed unexpectedly paralyzed or unprepared, despite days of rising tensions with Tibetan monks.
The absence of police officers emboldened the Tibetan crowds, which terrorized Chinese residents, toppled fire trucks and hurled stones into Chinese-owned shops. In turn, escalating violence touched off a sweeping crackdown and provided fodder for a propaganda-fueled nationalist backlash against Tibetans across the rest of China that is still under way.
“I really am surprised at the speed with which these things got out of control,” said Murray Scot Tanner, a China analyst with a specialty in policing. “This place, this time, should not have surprised them. This is one of the key cities in the country that they have tried to keep a lid on for two decades.”
What happened? Analysts wonder if the authorities, possibly fearing the public relations ramifications of a confrontation before the Beijing Olympics in August, told the police to avoid engaging protesters without high-level approval.
Timing also may have contributed to indecision; Tibet’s hard-line Communist Party boss, Zhang Qingli, and other top officials were attending the National People’s Congress in Beijing when the violence erupted.
The full explanation could take years to emerge from China’s Communist Party hierarchy. But the Lhasa unrest, not entirely unlike the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy protests of 1989, may be remembered as much for poor police work — faulty crowd control and political indecision followed by a large-scale response — as for the underlying grievances of protesters.
Lhasa now has created far more than a public relations problem for Beijing. It has unleashed widespread Tibetan resentment over Chinese rule. Antigovernment demonstrations have spread to Tibetan areas of western China. Military convoys and trucks of paramilitary police officers are streaming westward to quell the protests.
International leaders are alarmed at the violence and have called for restraint by China. But domestic opinion is inflamed with nationalist anger as state television is repeatedly showing images of Tibetans rioting in those early, unfettered hours.
“Our government should take a bloody suppression on these separatists!” blared one posting among the legion of enraged postings on Chinese Internet chat rooms. “We cannot hesitate or be too merciful, even at the cost of giving up the Olympics.”
The police hesitation did not last long. The crackdown began within 24 hours, on March 15. Witnesses described hearing the thud of tear gas projectiles and the crackle of gunshots as paramilitary police officers took control of the riot area. By March 16, the paramilitary police were searching Tibetan neighborhoods and seizing suspects. One foreigner saw four Tibetan men beaten so savagely that the police sprinkled white powder on the ground to cover the blood.
Lhasa’s death toll remains in sharp dispute. The Chinese authorities say 22 people died, including a police officer killed by a mob and shopkeepers who burned to death in the violence.
The authorities also claim security forces did not carry lethal weapons or fire a shot. But the Tibetan government in exile, in Dharamsala, India, said at least 99 Tibetans have died in Lhasa during the crackdown.
Foreign journalists are now forbidden to enter Tibet. But interviews with more than 20 witnesses show Lhasa was boiling with Tibetan resentment even as authorities believed they had the situation under control. Protests broke out at three monasteries beginning March 10, the anniversary of the failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule in 1959, which forced the Dalai Lama to flee to India.
The police arrested more than 60 monks and confined the rest in their monasteries. Tibetans say the police also beat monks during peaceful demonstrations.
James Miles, a Beijing-based reporter for The Economist magazine, had obtained approval from authorities for a reporting trip to Lhasa before the demonstrations. When the protests started, Mr. Miles wondered if he would be notified that his trip had been canceled. But no call came. He arrived March 12, and on March 13 officials took him to dinner, signaling their confidence by making no attempt to hide the recent demonstrations.
“I was assured that the situation in Lhasa was stable,” Mr. Miles recalled.
But the next day, March 14, would prove otherwise. At Ramoche Temple, monks left the monastery about midday to protest and were immediately met by police officers. Unlike the other monasteries, Ramoche is in the heart of Lhasa’s old Tibetan quarter, so the confrontation attracted a large crowd.
Unconfirmed reports about the earlier protests had been swirling among Tibetans for days, according to several people, including that monks and Buddhist nuns had been killed. Many Tibetans were angry when they saw the police clash with the Ramoche monks. Quickly, the crowd attacked the police.
Witnesses say police reinforcements who arrived with shields and riot gear were overwhelmed. “Almost immediately they were rushed by a massive group of Tibetans,” one witness said. Police officers fled, and a mob of Tibetans poured out of the old quarter onto Beijing Road, a large commercial street. A riot had begun.
Angry Tibetans attacked a branch of the Bank of China and burned it to a blackened husk. Photos and video images show Tibetans smashing Chinese shops with stones and setting them on fire. Witnesses described Tibetans attacking Chinese on bicycles and throwing rocks at taxis driven by Chinese. Later, crowds also burned shops owned by Muslims.
“This wasn’t organized, but it was very clear that they wanted the Chinese out,” said the American woman who witnessed the riots and asked not to be identified for fear of reprisals. She said Tibetan grievances exploded in anger. Crowds tied ceremonial silk scarves across the threshold of Tibetan shops to indicate they should not be damaged.
Mr. Miles, the journalist, found himself the only Western reporter on the scene. He spent the next several hours carefully walking around the old Tibetan quarter as rioters burned buildings and overturned cars. “I was looking around expecting an immediate, rapid response,” he said. “But nothing happened. I kept asking people, ‘Where are the police?’ ”
Protests are common in China and clashes can occur between demonstrators and police officers. Beginning in the early 1980s China created a paramilitary force, known as the People’s Armed Police, to deal with domestic unrest and other crises. Mr. Tanner, the specialist in Chinese policing, said the People’s Armed Police had developed tactics over the years to defuse protests without resorting to violent crackdowns. But riots of this scale are rare, and if violence erupts, policy dictates a firm response, Mr. Tanner said.
“There is no suggestion that they are supposed to sit back and let a riot burn itself out,” he said.
Tibetans also say the security forces were unusually passive at the beginning. One monk reached by telephone said other monks noticed that several officers were more interested in shooting video of the violence than stopping it. “They were just watching,” the monk said. “They tried to make some videos and use their cameras to take some photos.”
Ultimately, the man responsible for public order in Lhasa is Mr. Zhang, Tibet’s party chief. Mr. Zhang is a protégé of President Hu Jintao, whose own political career took flight after he crushed the last major rebellion in Tibet in 1989.
According to one biographer, Mr. Hu actually made himself unavailable during the 1989 riots when the paramilitary police needed guidance on whether to crack down. The police did so and Mr. Hu got credit for keeping order, but he also assured himself deniability if the crackdown had failed, the biographer wrote.
Mr. Zhang also has an excuse; he was at the National People’s Congress in Beijing. When the violence started, Mr. Zhang had just completed a two-hour online discussion about China’s Supreme Court, according to a government Web site. It is unclear when Mr. Zhang was told of the violence, or if he made the final decision on how to respond.
But that decision became clear on March 15, the day after the riots. During the riots, the police were armed with shields and batons, witnesses said. But overnight, the People’s Armed Police had encircled the riot areas. Armed vehicles also were in position. By afternoon, witnesses saw small teams of paramilitary officers with high-powered weapons moving into the old quarter.
Mr. Zhang would later declare “a bitter struggle of blood and fire against the Dalai clique, a struggle of life and death.”
The Chinese authorities have also confirmed that army troops had arrived in Lhasa by March 15, saying their role was limited to traffic control and securing military property. But many people question if some of those troops were involved in the crackdown. Several armored vehicles had their license plates removed or covered in white paper.
Mr. Miles noticed that many of the People’s Armed Police officers actually appeared to be wearing irregular uniforms. One military analyst who studied photographs of the scene concluded that some armored vehicles belonged to an elite military unit. Witnesses reported hearing the sounds of gunshots throughout that Saturday afternoon.
The crackdown was only one part of the new strategy. The Chinese news media initially had not been allowed to cover the Lhasa violence. But by March 15,, that had changed. There, broadcast on state television, was video of Tibetans raging through Lhasa. No images were shown of the crackdown the next day.
Zhang Jing, Huang Yuanxi and Chen Yang contributed research.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/world/asia/24tibet.html?sq=jim%20yardley&st=nyt&scp=3&pagewanted=print
纽约时报：西藏事发时，中国军警为何不及时制止？
(博讯北京时间2008年3月26日 转载)
北京——在3月14日拉萨事件爆发后混乱不堪的几个小时里，藏人横扫了这个城市的老城区，挥舞着钢制的刀鞘并乘乱抢劫汉人的商店。服装、旅游纪念品和其他的小饰品被扔到外面并被点燃，中午的天空因厚重灰黑的烟雾变得阴暗。藏人 狂暴而一发不可收拾。
目击了暴力事件的外国人和拉萨居民都为他们目睹的一切感到震惊，但同时也为他们所没有看到的事情感到惊诧：防暴警察在最初的小规模冲突发生后便消失得无影无踪。一些汉人店主乞求保护。
一个花费几个小时试图通过骚乱现场的美国妇女说：“我一整天没有见到哪怕一个警察或士兵。藏人随意乱跑。”
拉萨现在已经被数千名武警和解放军部队占领。但是目击者说，有差不多24小时，武警似乎莫名其妙地瘫痪了或者毫无准备，尽管与西藏僧侣们之间的紧张形势已经连续数日不断升级。
警察的缺位让汉人居民感到恐慌而给藏人壮了胆，藏人们推倒消防车并向汉人的商店投掷石块。结果，愈演愈烈的暴力事件引发了大规模的镇压并给中国其他地区在宣传鼓动下的民族主义者的反藏情绪提供了口实。
“我对事态失控的速度感到非常吃惊，”一名中国警务问题的分析家，莫雷•斯科特•特纳（Murray Scot Tanner）说。“此时此地，官方或许不会感到惊诧。拉萨是中国的关键城市之一而官方在过去的二十年里一直试图掩盖这里发生的一切。”
到底发生了什么？分析人士怀疑，官方是否由于担心公共关系方面的后果遭遇8月份在北京举办的奥运会而告诉警察在没有高层批准的情况下不得与抗议者接触？
特定的时机也或许促成了对事件处理的优柔寡断。在暴乱发生时，西藏强硬派的共产党书记张庆黎和其他高官正在北京参加全国人大会议。
尽管对这一事件的全部解释大概需要若干年才能从中国共产党统治集团中透露出来。但是在拉萨事件——多少类似于1989年天安门广场的民主抗议——中，人们会同时记住糟糕的警务工作——群体控制的失误和政治上的犹豫不决结果导致了大规模反响，以及抗议者埋藏的怨恨。
现在拉萨给北京带来的远不止是一个公共关系问题。它引发了藏人对中国统治的广泛不满。反政府示威还传播到中国西部的其他藏族地区。军队和武警的车队正向西调动去镇压抗议者。
外国领导人为这起暴力事件感到震惊并呼吁中国政府保持克制。但是，由于政府电视台不断播放在最初失控的几个小时里藏人暴动的画面，在中国国内激起了愤怒的民族主义情绪。
在中国互联网的聊天室里众多愤怒的留言中有一个留言叫喊道：“我们的政府应该对分裂主义者进行血腥镇压！” “哪怕奥运会不办，我们也不能再犹豫，不能太仁慈。”
不过，警察的犹豫并没有持续多久。3月15日，在骚乱开始后不到24小时镇压开始了。目击者讲述了在武警夺取对骚乱地区的控制时，他们听到催泪弹沉闷的爆炸声和枪弹爆裂声。到3月16日，武警开始在藏人社区搜捕嫌疑人。一名外国人看到四名藏人遭到毒打和警察在地上泼洒白灰遮盖血迹。
拉萨的死亡人数依然存在巨大分歧。中国官方说有22人丧生，其中包括一名被暴徒杀害的警察和几名在暴乱中被烧死的店主
当局同时宣称没有携带致命性武器和开火。但是在达兰萨拉的西藏流亡政府则说在镇压过程中至少有99名藏人死亡。
外国记者目前被禁止进入西藏。尽管官方相信他们已经控制了局势，但是对超过20名目击者的采访显示由于藏人的怨愤，拉萨形势仍然非常紧张。抗议在3月10日从三个寺院开始，这一天是1959年藏人一次失败的反抗中国的起义纪念日，这次起义迫使达赖喇嘛逃往印度。
警察逮捕了超过60名僧人并将其他僧人限制在寺院中。藏人说在和平示威期间警察还殴打了僧人。
在示威开始前，《经济学人》杂志驻北京记者詹姆斯•迈尔斯（James Miles）曾得到官方许可前往拉萨采访报道。在抗议开始时，迈尔斯先生曾想过或许会得到通知取消行程。可是并没有接到电话。他在3月12日到达拉萨，3 月13日政府官员邀请他赴宴，并通过没有试图掩饰最近的示威来表明他们的信心。
迈尔斯先生回想到：“我曾确信拉萨的局势是稳定的。”
但是第二天，3月14日，证明局势并非如此。在小昭寺，僧人们中午离开寺院进行抗议示威并马上遭遇了警察。与其他寺院不同，小昭寺位于拉萨旧城中心，因此这次对抗吸引了大批群众。
据一些人说，关于最初几天抗议的一些未经证实的消息几天来一直在藏人中间广为流传，其中包括说有僧人和尼姑被杀害。当藏人看到警察与小昭寺的僧人发生冲突时，他们非常愤怒。很快，人们开始袭击警察。
目击者说，配备盾牌和防暴装备赶来增援的警察也被击溃。一位目击者说：“他们差不多转眼间就受到一大群藏人的冲击。”警察逃离现场，而暴动的藏人从旧城区冲进了主要商业街北京路。暴乱开始了。
愤怒的藏人袭击了中国银行的一个分理处并将其烧得一团漆黑。照片和录像画面显示藏人用石块猛击汉人的商店并纵火焚烧。目击者描述了藏人袭击骑自行车的汉人并向汉人驾驶的出租车投掷石块。后来，人们也焚烧了穆斯林的商店。
“暴乱是没有组织的，但是很明显他们想赶走汉人，”那名目击了暴乱的美国妇女说，这名妇女由于害怕报复而不愿意透露身份。她说藏人的不满在愤怒中爆发。人们将哈达系在藏人商店的门上以表示不要破坏这些商店。
迈尔斯先生发现自己是唯一身处现场的西方记者。在暴乱者焚烧建筑物、推翻汽车的时候，他花了几个小时在老城区仔细走访。他说：“我到处观看，希望看到警方及时而迅速的反应措施。但是什么都没有发生。我不停地向人们询问，‘警察在哪里？’”
抗议在中国很普遍而警察和示威者之间也会发生冲突。从上世纪80年代早期开始，中国建立了一个准军事化部队，即人们所知的“人民武装警察”，以处理国内动乱和其他危机。中国警务问题专家特纳先生说，近些年在诉诸武力镇压的前提下阻拦示威者方面，武警的战术已经有所发展。但是，这种规模的暴乱是罕见的，而一旦发生暴乱，政策则规定采取强硬措施，特纳先生说。
他说：“他们似乎没有任何理由坐视而任由暴乱自生自灭。”
藏人也说，在暴乱开始时，安全部队异常消极。一位通过电话联系上的僧人说，有其他僧人注意到有数名警察对拍摄暴乱的录像更感兴趣而不是制止暴乱。这位僧人说：“他们只是旁观，拍摄录像和用他们的相机拍照。”
最终负责拉萨公共秩序的是西藏自治区书记张庆黎。张先生是胡锦涛主席提拔的继任者，而胡的政治生涯在1989年镇压了西藏上一次严重反叛后得到飞升。
根据一位传记作家的观点，在1989年暴乱期间，胡先生竟然让别人联系不上自己，而当时武警需要就是否进行镇压得到上级指示。结果，警察进行了镇压而胡先生则因维护了秩序而得到肯定。如果一旦镇压失败，他也确保自己可以用不知情做推托，这位传记作家写道。
张先生也有这样一个借口：他在北京参加全国人大会议。据一家政府网站说，暴乱开始时，张先生刚刚结束一个有关中国最高法院问题的长达两个小时的在线讨论。目前不清楚张先生是何时得知暴乱，或者如何处置暴乱的最终决定是否由他做出。
但是，在暴乱开始一天后的3月15日，这个决定就明朗了。目击者说，暴乱时警察配备的是盾牌和警棍。而一夜过后，武警合围了暴乱地区。武装车辆也已就位。到了下午，目击者看到数小队武警携带高杀伤性武器向老城区开进。
张先生后来宣告了这“一场与达赖集团的血与火的严酷斗争，一场生与死的斗争。”
中国当局也已经证实，到3月15日，军队已经抵达拉萨，并且说他们的作用仅限于控制交通和保护军队财产。但是很多人质疑是否有部分军队参与了镇压。有数辆装甲车的牌照被摘除或用白纸遮盖。
迈尔斯先生注意到很多的武警实际上似乎穿着的不是通常的制服。一位研究了现场照片的军事分析家得出结说，有些装甲车辆隶属于中国精锐部队。目击者报告说，整个星期天的下午都能听到枪声。
这次镇压只不过是新战略的一部分。中国新闻媒体最初不允许报道拉萨暴乱。但是到3月15日，情况改变了。国家电视台播出了藏人在拉萨横冲直撞的录像。没有播放任何第二天镇压的画面。
迈尔斯先生注意到很多的武警实际上似乎穿着的不是通常的制服。一位研究了现场照片的军事分析家得出结说，有些装甲车辆隶属于中国精锐部队。目击者报告说，整个星期天的下午都能听到枪声。
这次镇压只不过是新战略的一部分。中国新闻媒体最初不允许报道拉萨暴乱。但是到3月15日，情况改变了。国家电视台播出了藏人在拉萨横冲直撞的录像。没有播放任何第二天镇压的画面。
http://news.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2008/03/200803260213.shtml
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